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The Robert Schuman Centre was set up by the High Council o f the EUI in 
1993 to carry out disciplinary and interdisciplinary research in the areas of 
European integration and public policy in Europe. While developing its own 
research projects, the Centre works in close relation with the four departments 
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In Belgium, as in other arenas and levels of policymaking, a gradual change is 
taking place in the choice of environmental policy instruments: where 
environmental policy until recently was exclusively characterised by command 
and control, the market-based approach is becoming increasingly popular (Gains 
and Westin 1991, OECD 1993, Deketelaere and Martens 1994, Deketelaere and 
Pittevils 1995).
This contribution will briefly analyse the Belgian experience with traditional 
instruments of environmental protection, and then explore the ways in which a 
variety of new environmental policy instruments have been applied. Belgium is a 
federal state, made up of three communities and three regions. The latter, which 
include the Flemish Region, the Walloon Region and the Brussels-Capital 
Region, have substantial environmental competences. As a consequence, five sets 
of environmental legislation must be taken into account: the Flemish, Walloon, 
Brussels, federal and European environmental legislation. While each of these 
will be discussed at various points throughout this paper, the analysis will 
primarily deal with Flemish environmental legislation and federal environmental 
legislation which is applicable in the Flemish Region.
Environmental Protection in Belgium
In many European countries, including Belgium, the use of instruments of direct 
regulation (prohibitions, restrictions, permit systems, notification systems) in 
environmental policy prevailed in the sixties, seventies, eighties and even (the 
beginning of) the nineties (OECD 1993). The advantages of these instruments, 
known as command and control, are well known: they establish clear 
environmental norms which must be met, these norms apply to everybody, the 
government must not evaluate the individual circumstances of thousands of 
different cases, and the use of general norms limits administrative discretionary 
power and makes it easier for companies to plan their own environmental policy.
On the basis of these classic arguments, Belgium traditionally made enormous 
use of command and control environmental regulation. Federal environmental 
legislation (town and country planning (1962), air pollution control (1965), 
protection of surface waters (1971), protection against noise (1973), nature 
protection (1973), the management of risks of heavy accidents with certain 
industrial activities (1987), and the protection against ionising radiations (1994)), 
and also (later) regional (Flemish) environmental legislation (waste management 
(1981 and 1994), groundwater management (1984), environmental permits (1985, 
1991 and 1995), environmental impact assessment (1989), protection of forests 



























































































extraction (1993), environmental policy agreements (1994), environmental 
planning (1995), environmental care at plant level (1995), soil sanitation (1995), 
and spatial planning (1996)), established a wide variety of prohibitions and 
restrictions. Not only the original versions of these laws and decrees contained 
those instruments of direct regulations. Later modifications and updates also used 
these instruments, be it not (more) exclusively but in combination with other 
environmental policy instruments.
As an example of this still current command and control approach, the 
Flemish government fixed in 1995, for the first time, a general legal basis for the 
adoption and the use of environmental quality norms for the protection of the 
environment (although such quality norms were already used for a number of 
years in the framework of specific sectoral laws and decrees) (Lefebure 1996). 
These norms indicate the maximum allowed amounts of pollution factors in the 
atmosphere, the water or the soil. They can also determine which natural or other 
elements must be present in the environment in view of the protection of the 
ecosystems and the promotion of biological diversity. A distinction must be made 
between basic environmental quality norms (which establish quality demands 
throughout the whole Flemish Region) and specific environmental quality norms 
(which apply in areas which need special protection). Environmental quality 
norms can be fixed in the form of limit values (which may not be exceeded) and 
directional values (which must be achieved as much as possible or maintained).
Environmental quality norms (as fixed in part 2 of the so-called VLAREM II, 
the decision of the Flemish Government of 1 June 1995) are used in the Flemish 
Region for noise, surfacewaters, soil, groundwater and air (Lefebure 1996). Also 
sustainable development and protection of a healthy environment are considered 
as general basic environmental quality norms.
The general and sectoral environmental conditions for classified installations, 
as embedded in part 4 and part 5 of VLAREM II, are considered to agree with the 
best available technologies (BAT) (Gille and Lambrecht 1996). VLAREM II also 
prescribes that every licensee must apply BAT in order to protect man and 
environment. Before the adoption of VLAREM II (original version 1992 / present 
version 1995), there was no general obligation to apply BAT. In that period, 
application of BAT was only foreseen in laws and/or decrees, implementing 
European environmental directives which imposed the application of BAT. This 
means that environmental legislation, and the instruments of direct regulation in 
that legislation, in that period did not always reflect the BAT of that time. Rather, 
most instruments of direct regulation arose from political and technical 
consultation groups, composed of representatives of all concerned parties 




























































































parties in this process of standard setting was and is still exceptional. A clear 
example in the Flemish environmental policy however was the adoption of the 
"manure-action-plan" (De Batselier 1996): because of the alliance of the 
agricultural organisations with the Christian-Democratic Party, this party 
intervened explicitly in the setting of the standards for the production and 
spreading of manure; this led to a real confrontation with the former Socialist 
Minister for the Environment, Mr. Norbert De Batselier, regardless of the fact that 
the Socialist Party was at that time the coalition partner of the Christian- 
Democratic Party. Because almost no fanners vote for the Socialist Party, this 
party could go very far in (proposals for) the setting of manure standards, and in 
this way, also profile itself as a "green" party.
The Introduction of New Environmental Policy Instruments
During the eighties and the beginning of the nineties, awareness grew that 
environmental policy goals could no longer be achieved by instruments of direct 
regulation alone. The main disadvantages of instruments of direct regulation are 
that they are often inflexible and economically inefficient, and discourage the 
development of clean technology (OECD 1993).
This new awareness had different causes. First of all, there was increased 
pressure from public opinion. Several environmental catastrophes (Bhopal, 
Seveso, Amoco Cadiz) and the publication of several (alarming) international, 
European, national and regional environmental reports increased substantially the 
environmental awareness of public opinioh, which demanded more stringent and 
efficient environmental policy. Secondly, this increased environmental awareness 
was translated in a more concrete and active way by the green NGO's, who 
enjoyed great support during the eighties and the beginning of the nineties. They 
managed to put the problem of efficiency of environmental policy on the political 
agenda and to force the government in a more or less new direction. Thirdly, at 
the level of the Flemish government, there was an ambitious Christian- 
Democratic Minister for the Environment, who, for the first time, introduced a 
long term policy vision concerning real and effective environmental protection, 
with ambitious goals. Fourthly, and in my opinion the most important reason for a 
shift in the choice of environmental policy instruments, the lack of (Flemish) 
government means (both technical and financial). This led primarily to the 
introduction of (financing) environmental taxes (lack of financial means), 





























































































Fifthly, the position of industry has always been a bit ambiguous. On the on 
hand they were in fact not demanding a change of environmental policy 
(instruments). This is quite understandable because instruments of direct 
regulation are the kind of instruments industry can best cope with. However, 
because they often were too stringent at short notice and changed very often, 
Flemish instruments of direct regulation have been heavily contested by industry 
in recent years. On the other hand, industry has always had a positive and 
cooperative reaction to new environmental policy instruments on the condition 
that they were drafted and introduced in what hey deemed to be a reasonable way. 
Because this was not always the case, on the regional or federal level, industry 
has also often opposed new environmental policy instruments. Finally, interest in 
expanding the arsenal of federal and regional environmental policy instruments 
was also highly influenced by the declarations, initiatives and activities of the EC 
and the OECD in this field.
In light of these reasons or appeals for reform, the number of Belgian instru­
ments of direct regulation was supplemented by a variety of new instruments 
devoted to market regulation, social regulation, planning and financial aid 
(Deketelaere 1991, 1992, 1995, Deketelaere and Martens 1994, 1995, Dekete- 
laere and Pittevils 1995). So, this means that in fact (i) the number of instruments 
of direct regulation did not decline and (ii) a lot of those instruments were not 
replaced by other instruments.
All of this happened in a period of consolidation of environmental 
competences of the regions (by the third (1988) and fourth (1993) reform of the 
state), as well as in the period of drafting the first "Environment and Nature Plan" 
for the Flemish Region (1990). But perhaps the most significant catalyst in this 
policy period, and in this policy shift towards new instruments, was the formation 
by the (former and present) Flemish Minister for the Environment (Mr. Theo 
Kelchtermans) of the “Interuniversity Commission for the Reform of the 
Environmental Legislation in the Flemish Region,” which operated during the 
period 1989-1995 (IUCHM 1995). The task of that Commission was to integrate 
environmental concerns into other policy areas, but at the same time to rationalise 
and simplify environmental legislation, increase its efficiency and improve means 
for its enforcement. The Interuniversity Commission’s "draft framework decree 
on environmental policy" led to several of the new instruments discussed below. 
In the future, more new decrees will be adopted and more existing environmental 
legislation will be modified on the basis of this draft.
The creation of the Interuniversity Commission was not a consequence of 
industry or green NGO's pressure. It was the consequence of a combined 




























































































ambitious Christian-Democratic Minister for the Environment was nominated; the 
department of environment became more and more important, not only for 
reasons of public opinion but also for reasons of budget figures and political 
power. On the other hand, there was the academic world which was strongly 
interested, for academic and financial reasons, in the enormous project of 
rewriting Flemish environmental legislation.
But, a bit in contrast with his academic-legislative initiative, this same 
Minister for the Environment also produced a lot of environmental legislation 
during his first legislature (1989-1992) (Deketelaere 1994c). A great percentage 
of the legislation of this period can be characterised as command and control: a 
large number of new prohibitions, restrictions and quality norms were introduced. 
However, it is also in this period that a start was made with the introduction of 
new environmental policy instruments. For example, for financial reasons, 
financing environmental taxes were made operational since the beginning of the 
nineties.
Because in recent years the instruments of direct regulation were only 
supplemented with other environmental policy instruments and not replaced, the 
most important reproach to the present Minister for the Environment (Mr. Theo 
Kelchtermans) is that until now only new (even more stringent) environmental 
legislation was created (consisting of all kinds of environmental policy 
instruments) but that no environmental legislation was yet abolished. In order to 
meet with this demand, the Minister for the Environment has recently created a 
new commission ("Commission Evaluation Environmental Legislation"), which, 
in the first place, must make a technical and economic evaluation of the 
legislation concerning environmental permit demands and procedures. The 
intention is that after this specific evaluation, a global evaluation of the whole 
environmental legislation will be undertaken, from a technical, economic and 
legal perspective.
New Instruments in Practice
Environmental levies
The recently developed environmental tax legislation in Belgium includes two 






























































































Financing environmental levies (levies aimed at financing the environmental 
policy of the government, be it totally or partially) were introduced throughout 
the 1980s and have become the most widely used new environmental instrument 
of market regulation in Belgian (Deketelaere and Pittevils 1995) and Flemish 
(Deketelaere and Martens 1994) environmental policy.
At the federal level, they were introduced for certain industrial activities 
which can cause heavy accidents (1990), the private use of energy (1993), 
ionising radiations (1994) and dangerous products (1994), and are deposited in 
specific sectoral funds which finance a few very expensive policy fields (nuclear 
plants, Seveso-companies, emergency planning, ionising radiations).
In addition to federal action, the Flemish Region established levies on the 
removal of waste (1986 and 1990), the pollution of surface waters (1990), the 
overproduction of manure (1991), the delivery of a permit for the intake of water 
(1990), the extraction of gravel (1993), and the import or export of waste (1994). 
Also the Walloon Region introduced in recent years levies on the discharge of 
industrial and household waste water (1990), the removal of waste (1991), and on 
groundwater and drinking water (1990). The Brussels Capital Region has adopted 
the following financing environmental levies: a levy on the delivery of envi­
ronmental permits (1992) and a levy on the discharge of waste water (1996). The 
revenues of the most important Flemish environmental levies are deposited in the 
so-called MINA-Fund, and finance, especially, the building of water purification 
plants, sewerage systems and the regional environmental institutions.
The obvious advantage of financing environmental levies is of course that 
they can raise a lot of money. These levies are often the most important financial 
source for funding environmental policy of the competent authority. The 
disadvantage of financing environmental levies is that they are not a correct 
implementation of the polluter pays principle. They are in general too low for the 
large polluters and too high for the small polluters: the taxed polluting products, 
services or activities don’t disappear from the market because the large polluter 
can easily pay the levy and decide not to change his behaviour; the small polluter 
can just pay the levy but does not change his behaviour because he has no money 
left to finance cleaner alternative production methods.
Although every financing environmental levy also has a certain regulatory 
effect, most of the federal and regional environmental levies in Belgium are 
aimed at revenue raising rather than providing incentives for environmentally 




























































































ment of the environment is limited and their contribution to the concerned budget 
funds is significant (Van Humbeeck 1992).
This was proven by different studies of the Flemish Steering and Working 
Group on Environmental Levies (X 1993): the revenues of the most important 
Flemish environmental levies amount approximately to 10 billion BF, what is 
presently the most important source for the financing of Flemish environmental 
policy. A similar environmental policy without those financial means would not 
be possible in the Flemish region, certainly not if the only alternative were to 
draw funding from the general budget of the Flemish Government. The same 
studies have indicated that the environmental benefits created by those financing 
environmental levies are not impressive. On the contrary, any improvements 
made in environmental quality in the Flemish Region will certainly not have 
resulted from the new (financing) environmental levies alone. The recent and 
more stringent environmental instruments of direct regulation have been at least 
as important.
It is self-evident that the introduction in recent years of financing 
environmental levies has been (heavily) contested, by green NGO's as well as by 
industry. Green NGO's and political parties have continuously been pleading for 
regulating environmental levies (Steenwegen 1993a, 1993b, Pauwels and 
Decoster 1995); industry has always asked for environmental levies which were 
"society-relevant" (i.e. which take into account the pollution caused not only by 
industry, but also by households and farmers) and which implement the “polluter 
pays principle” ( financing environmental levies violate this with a minimum rate 
and amount, to be paid by all possible tax payers) (VEV 1995a, 1995b).
Regulating environmental levies
In contrast to financing environmental levies, the big advantage of regulating 
environmental levies is that in general they seek to change the incentives facing 
consumers and producers rather than simply raising tax revenue (OECD 1993). 
Levies are high enough and targeted well enough so that the taxed polluting 
products, activities or services disappear from the market in a short period of 
time. These levies are a real implementation of the polluter pays principle.
However, it must be said that regulating environmental levies are often 
characterised by (i) a wrong choice of levy base; (ii) a wrong choice of levy rate;
(iii) bad timing of introduction; (iv) poor co-ordination with other policy areas 
(which influence environmental policy) (OECD 1993). This will be illustrated 




























































































The 1993 levy on products damaging the environment ("ecotax") is presently 
the only real regulating environmental levy used in regional and/or federal 
environmental policy in Belgium (Van Orshoven 1993, Deketelaere 1994a, 
1994b, 1996a). As concerns the motives for its introduction, they are quite 
strange. In 1993, when the fourth reform of the state had to be approved by the 
federal Parliament, the ruling majority needed the votes of some opposition 
parties, because the approval needed a two-thirds majority. Green parties 
(AGALEV, ECOLO) in particular were the ones who furnished the necessary 
votes. In return, however, they demanded an ecotax on packaging, packaging 
waste and environment unfriendly products. In this way, the ecotax was bom, 
quite unexpected and quite unprepared.
The levy concerned the following products: beverage packaging; throw-away 
cameras and razors; batteries; packaging for certain industrial products; 
insecticides; paper. In most cases, the levy could be avoided (by meeting 
recycling and /or re-use percentages or by establishing deposit-refund systems), 
or reductions and exemptions could be obtained. The levy was equated to excise 
duties and placed on a product because of the damage which it is was deemed to 
cause to the environment.
However, when the levy on products damaging the environment was introdu­
ced in 1993 in Belgium, all of the abovementioned possible problems with 
regulating environmental levies appeared (Deketelaere 1994a, 1994b, 1996a) and 
provoked a lot of protests from industry (VEV 1995b):
(i) there was a wrong choice of levy base, in that in some cases, the levy base 
could not be controlled or there were no environment-friendly alternatives for the 
taxed products (being one of the basic ideas and conditions for the choice of 
taxed products); this was particularly problematic for the levy on paper (the levy 
base, being the amount of recycled fibres in the paper, was unverifiable) and 
insecticides (many insecticides were taxed, although there was no environment- 
friendly alternative for all concerned insecticides);
(ii) There was a wrong choice of levy rate. It was often too high taking into 
account the absence of an environment-friendly alternative for the taxed product 
and the introduction at short notice of the tax; this was particularly problematic 
for the levy on throw-away cameras (300 BF/camera), throw-away razors 
(lOBF/razor) and batteries (20 BF/battery);
(iii) The introduction of the levy was poorly timed. For certain products it was 
due almost immediately; this was a major problem for the levy on beverage 




























































































January 1994) and paper (1 January 1994); taking into account that the levy was 
only published in the Belgian State Gazette of 20 July 1993, it was impossible for 
industry to adjust its production processes in order to avoid the levy;
(iv) There was poor co-ordination with other policy areas. Introduced as a federal 
levy, no account was taken of regional environmental policy (particularly regional 
waste policy, which already foresaw some ecotaxed products), federal fiscal 
policy (which had its own classification of products subjected to excise duties) or 
European environmental policy (where product-oriented environmental policy is 
governed by notification and technical information obligations (directive 83/189) 
as well as by directives 75/442 on waste, 91/157 on batteries and 94/62 on 
packaging and packaging waste).
The consequence of all these problems was that the different levies were 
repeatedly postponed for most of the ecotaxed products. Often demanded by 
industry because of economic reasons, postponements were always condemned 
by green NGO's and political parties (Steenwegen 1993a, 1993b, Pauwels and 
Decoster 1995). This was, for example, the case with the choice for recycling of 
beverage packagings instead of re-use, and with the reduction in the number of 
ecotaxed pesticides.
In its present form, the ecotax can in fact be more accurately characterised as a 
financing environmental levy than as a regulating environmental levy. The main 
lines of the present regulation (originally of 16 July 1993, amended 7 March 
1996) can be summarised as follows (Deketelaere 1996a):
(i) A 15 BF levy on all packaging brought into consumption, regardless of the 
contents, the cubic measure, or the material from which it is produced. 
Exemptions are made for the setting up of a deposit system for re-usable 
packagings, or for attaining specified recycling percentages for recyclable 
packagings; this levy took effect on the following dates: 1 April 1994 for 
packagings of beer, soda water, cola and other lemonades; 1 January 1996 for 
packagings of other beverages;
(ii) A 10 BF and 300 BF levy, respectively, on disposable razors and disposable 
cameras. Exemptions are made in the case of razors for medical use, and, in the 
case of cameras, for the setting up of a collection system which attains specified 
re-use and/or recycling percentages; this levy took effect on 30 January 1994 for 




























































































(iii) A 20 BF levy on batteries. Exemptions are made for setting up a deposit 
system, return premium system, or collection- and recycling system; this levy 
took effect 1 January 1996;
(iv) A 25 BF levy per volume-unit liter of packaging, with a maximum of 500 
BF/packaging. Exemptions are made in the case of setting up a deposit system for 
gum, solvents and insecticides brought into consumption and which are used 
professionally. This tax came into effect 1 January 1996;
(v) A 10 or 2 BF levy per gram of certain active substances. Some exemptions are 
made for insecticides. This ecotax took effect 1 July 1996;
(vi) A proposed 10 BF levy per kg paper or cardboard unless specified 
proportions of recycled fibres are not attained. A number of (inconsistent) 
exemptions are planned;
As regards financial impact, one can only say that this ecotax, until now, has been 
an expensive matter for the federal government. Its installation and application 
has cost a few tens or hundreds of million BF, while the revenues, although they 
are not pursued (because it is a regulating environmental levy), amount so far to 
only a few million BF, which, moreover, are distributed among the regions for 
environmental purposes.
As regards efficiency, it must be admitted that the ecotax, in spite of the many 
problems, has been very successful (Deketelaere 1995, 1996a). Several years 
before the compulsory introduction of measures concerning packaging and 
packaging waste (in 1996, implementing directive 94/62/EC), the Belgian ecotax, 
indebted or not, already forced industry to take measures in this field. With the 
ecotax as a stick behind the door, different branches of Belgian industry managed 
to adjust their products and production processes from an environmental point of 
view. As mentioned before, specific, environment-friendly collection systems 
were set up, for example for beverage packagings, batteries and disposable 
cameras. Of course, this also influenced consumer behaviour.
Instruments o f financial aid
Although the federal government has been reducing the (fiscal) possibilities for 
investment deduction in general, the federal Code of Income Taxes provides since 
the beginning of the 1990s for an increased investment deduction for 
environmentally friendly investments (Deketelaere and Martens 1996). The 
-4" standard deduction is increased (up to 13.5% in 1996) when the investment 




























































































limiting as much as possible negative environmental effects, and also those which 
increase industrial energy efficiency.
Increased (regional) expansion aid for environment friendly investments is 
another example of a (fiscal) subsidy or (direct/indirect) financial aid. It can take 
the form of an investment premium or a repayable rentless advance. The introduc­
tion on the regional level of such an increased expansion aid was only possible 
after a revision of the expansion aid legislation in the beginning of the nineties. 
The former legislation (which was of a very general nature and made it possible 
to grant aid to almost every company on an ad hoc basis, without any sectoral or 
regional responsibility) was namely not in accordance with the European 
legislative framework on state aid (Article 92 EC-Treaty).
In the Flemish Region, increased expansion aid for environment friendly 
investments by small companies was already introduced in 1990 (on the basis of 
the so-called "ecology-criterion"). In the Walloon and Brussels Capital Region, 
similar legislation concerning the use of increased expansion aid for environment 
friendly investments has also been adopted in the first half of the nineties.
*
The main advantage of increased investment deductions and increased 
financial aid for environmentally friendly investments is that they can help to 
convince companies to invest in clean technology and environmentally friendly 
research and development (OECD 1993). The main drawbacks, however, are that 
the awarded percentage or the available amount of money is too low (only a 
13.5% increased investment deduction and about 3 billion BF increased 
expansion aid in the Flemish Region), divided among large companies (the so- 
called Matthew-effect), can be lowered each year, and be spread over (too) many 
companies. Thus these instruments are usually not decisive factors in the decision 
about an investment, but only small additional incentives.
¥
Tax differentiation
The use of differentiated tax rates for products and/or services, according to their 
environmental characteristics, is quite new and fits in the framework of the so- 
called "greening of taxation"— shifting the tax burden from labour and capital to 
environment unfriendly products and services (OECD 1993). Interesting fields of 
action are products and/or services subjected to excise duties and value added tax. 
These indirect taxes (and their possible different rates) make it possible to 
stimulate the use of environment friendly products and/or services and to 
discourage the use of their environment unfriendly alternatives. This instrument is 
an indirect subsidy or financial aid: the consumer avoids paying a (higher) tax, 




























































































Tax differentiation has as its main advantage that it can be a very effective and 
efficient environmental policy instrument. Experience has shown that if the 
difference in tax rate is large enough, the results can be tremendous. In Belgium, 
tax differentiation for environmental goals can be found in the field of excise 
duties on petrol and heavy fuel, as introduced in the beginning of the nineties 
(Pittevils 1991). The excise duty rate on leaded petrol (21.4 BF/1) (total price of 
39.40 BF/1 at the pump on 31/10/96) is (still) higher than the one on unleaded 
petrol (19.0 BF/1) (total price of 37.10 BF/1 at the pump on 31/10/96) and the 
excise duty rate on heavy fuel with a high sulphur content (0.25 BF/kg) is (still) 
higher than the one on heavy fuel with a low sulphur content (0.75 BF/kg).
These differentiated rates have proven to be very effective. For example, there 
has been a considerable shift from leaded petrol to unleaded petrol in Belgium 
(see also ch 11). However, now that almost every Belgian uses unleaded petrol, 
the federal government is once again reducing the difference in excise duties 
between unleaded and leaded petrol, but this time to the disadvantage of unleaded 
petrol, in order to raise revenues.
Another Belgian fiscal initiative concerning cars dates back to the beginning 
of the nineties: the fiscal stimulation of the anticipated use of clean cars (as 
suggested by EC directives 70/220 and 88/76) (Deketelaere 1991). The 
anticipated use of cars with catalytic converters was rewarded by a repayment of 
the traffic levy. This fiscal measure proved very successful.
However, the use of tax differentiation as an environmental policy instrument 
is still very limited because the scope of possible environment unfriendly 
products, activities and services for which differentiated tax rates (value added 
tax and excise duties) can be created, is very small. However, alteration is 
possible. An ecological revision of the (partially) European harmonised value 
added tax - and excise duty - legislation could create a lot more possibilities for 
this promising environmental policy instrument.
Environmental labels
The creation in 1994 of a Belgian Committee for the Award of Environmental 
Labels is the consequence of a European obligation (Regulation 880/92 on eco­
labels) (Jadot and De Sadeleer 1992, see ch 9).
However, already in 1991, the misuse in advertising of unofficial 
environmental labels (for so-called environment friendly products) led to the 
adoption of some interesting provisions concerning the commerce practiceand 




























































































be introduced with the president of the tribunal of first instance, asking for the 
suspension of misleading (environmental) publicity. A Commission for Environ­
mental Labelling and Environmental Publicity was also created in 1995 (Van 
Calster 1995).
Taking into account the recent character of most of these initiatives (1991, 
1994 and 1995), no serious data are yet available concerning the use, the success 
and/or the failure of these measures concerning environmental labelling and/or 
environmental publicity.
Environmental policy agreements
Since the second half of the eighties, a number of voluntary (federal) 
environmental policy agreements were concluded in Belgium (Bocken and Traest 
1991). Under a (voluntary) environmental agreement between the federal 
government and industry, the latter commits itself to make special efforts to 
reduce one or other form of pollution, while the government promises not to 
adopt new legislation in this particular field (see chs 1 and 8). The use of this 
environmental policy instrument was a consequence, on the one hand, of the 
growing environmental awareness, commitment and engagement of the industry 
and, on the other hand, the aspiration of the government for voluntary co­
operation with entrepreneurs instead of the use of instruments of direct 
regulation.
These federal (voluntary) environmental agreements all aimed at a reduction 
of different forms of pollution: for example the reduction (and eventual 
elimination) of the use of CFC's, reduction of the emission of S 0 2 and reduction 
of the production of packaging waste. Although quite successful (because of the 
fact that the goals of these agreements where not that ambitious), these 
agreements had a kind of "grey area" existence-their elaboration, adoption and 
application was not always clear; the impression existed that in most cases the 
government was a more demanding party than industry, and was therefore more 
easily satisfied with unambitious goals; the impression also existed that industry 
was often better informed than the government about the (detrimental) 
environmental impact of products and/or activities, and used that (superior) 
position in the elaboration and the setting of the environmental goals which had 
to be achieved; a general legal framework concerning these kind of agreements 
was lacking.
Because of these problems, which highlighted the public nature of the 
agreement, and the need for ultimate governmental control, the Interuniversity 




























































































environmental policy agreements should be created (IUCHM 1995). This 
framework was eventually adopted by decree of the Flemish Parliament in June 
1994, putting an end to the "grey zone" existence of those agreements and the 
often superior position of industry.
According to this framework (Lietaer 1994, Van Hoorick and Lambert 1995), 
a voluntary agreement is possible between the Flemish Region, represented by the 
Flemish Government, and one or more representative umbrella organisations of 
companies, with the goal to limit or prevent environmental pollution, or to 
promote more effective environmental management. A voluntary agreement 
cannot replace or be less stringent than the prevailing legislation or regulations. 
During its validity period, which cannot exceed five years, the Flemish Region 
cannot issue regulations which are more stringent than those in the agreement. 
However, the Flemish Region remains competent to issue regulations, either in 
case of urgent necessity, or in order to fulfil compelling obligations of an 
international or European legal nature. Similar legislation concerning the use of 
environmental policy agreements does not exist (yet) in the Walloon and Brussels 
Capital Region.
However, since its adoption, not one new environmental policy agreement has 
been concluded in Flanders. The reason for this is that the legal framework for the 
adoption of environmental policy agreements is too strict: a very detailed 
procedure must be followed, both ndw and former members of the umbrella 
organisations are bound by the agreement, the decree is of public order, what 
means that all established legal rules must be followed in detail, and if not, the 
agreement is null and void. Unless these characteristics of the present legal 
framework are modified, environmental policy agreements only have a bleak 
future in the Flemish Region.
Environmental care systems
The goal of an environmental care system is the construction of an instrument at 
plant level which limits the total environmental burden of a company 
(Deketelaere 1996b, see also ch 10). On the European level (EMAS-regulation 
1863/93), a lot of attention has been paid to environmental care at plant level. As 
a consequence, the use of environmental care systems as an instrument in Flemish 
environmental policy was a suggestion of the Interuniversity Commission 
(IUCHM 1995), and led to the adoption of a decree on such systems in April 
1995 (Deketelaere 1995b, 1996). In contrast to the EMAS-regulation however, 
the Flemish environmental care system is only a partial environmental care 
system and not an integral environmental care system. The Flemish legislature 




























































































system would limit themselves to a formal and minimalist application of it, in 
which case the legal obligation would miss its aim. Therefore, the Flemish 
environmental care system was limited to six elements (Deketelaere, M. 1996): 
the appointment of an environmental co-ordinator; the drafting of an environ­
mental audit; the measurement and registration of emissions and immissions; the 
drafting of a yearly environmental report; the elaboration of a company policy in 
order to avoid heavy accidents and to reduce their consequences for man and 
environment; and the obligation to notify and to warn authorities in case of 
accidental emissions and disturbances.
It must be said (and as is demonstrated by the EU EMAS) that an integral 
environmental audit contains much more than these six elements. EU EMAS, 
which is an example of an integral environmental audit system, for example, also 
requires, among other things, the drafting of an environmental programme and an 
environmental declaration.
The before mentioned environmental audit, an important part of the Flemish 
environmental care system (Gille 1996), is a systematic, documented and objec­
tive evaluation of the policy, the organisation and equipment of an establishment 
or an activity in the field of environment protection. The environmental audit has 
to be verified by an external environmental validator. The Flemish Government 
has indicated for which categories of establishments one (once-only) or more 
(periodical) environmental audits are required and which elements have to be 
notified to the administration. Similar legislation concerning the use of environ­
mental care systems does not exist in the Walloon or Brussels Capital Region.
The compulsory introduction in the Flemish Region of an environmental care 
system at plant level can have quite a lot of advantages (Deketelaere 1996b): (i) it 
can reduce the regulatory burden on industry by making the individual company 
responsible for its own environmental actions; (ii) it furnishes the environmental 
authorities with a lot of necessary environmental information; (iii) it makes better 
co-operation possible between the companies and the competent authorities. 
However, since this system of environmental care at plant level only entered into 
force in recent months, it is not clear yet whether all of these possible advantages 
will be realised. Probably, a lot will depend on the (environmental) willingness of 
individual companies.
It must be said that environmental care systems also could have some 
disadvantages (Deketelaere 1996b). In particular, they create a huge amount of 
paperwork (audit, registrations, report, etc.), and above all quite a few problems 
of personal liability. Certainly in the Flemish environmental care debate, the 




























































































control the compliance of the company with the environmental legislation) and 
the leading officials of the company (who have to execute the advice of the 
environmental co-ordinator) is the central point of discussion (Faure 1996).
While it is not clear yet whether all of these possible disadvantages will 
materialise in practise, some have already been strongly emphasised by industry. 
For example, they are happy with neither the very broad description of the tasks 
of the environmental co-ordinator, because of liability reasons, nor with the 
important role which is foreseen for the Committee for Safety, Health and 
Embellishment of the Working Places (e.g. will this Committee agree with the 
person who is appointed as environmental co-ordinator?).
Deposit, refund, return premium or other collection systems
Deposit, refund, return premium or other collection systems oblige the buyer of a 
product, on top of the price of that product, to pay an amount of money to the 
seller. This amount is paid back to the buyer when he returns the product to the 
seller or an appointed third person. The introduction in Belgium of deposit, 
refund, return premium or other collection systems as environmental policy 
instruments is totally connected with the levy on products damaging the envi­
ronment (Deketelaere 1995, 1996a). As indicated above, these systems are a way 
for industry to avoid the Belgian ecotax by taking responsibility for environ­
mental harm: there are no levies on most of the ecotaxed products (beverage 
packagings, disposable cameras, batteries, packagings for certain industrial 
products) when a deposit, refund, return premium or other collection system that 
meets established conditions, is set up. As a consequence, the real goal of the 
present ecotax legislation is that not one branch of industry pays the levy. If every 
branch of industry meets its (environmental) responsibility by setting up one or 
other sufficient collection system (as already has been done by the battery and 
disposable camera industries), no branch of industry will pay ecotaxes.
The setting up of deposit, refund, return premium or other collection systems 
has the advantage that all concerned producers and consumers can shoulder their 
(environmental) responsibility. In this way, these systems are a good application 
of the polluter pays principle- those who bring polluting products on the market 
engage themselves to take those products back after use. This also improves 
control and organisation of the management of specific waste streams and makes 
a final solution more likely.
The application of these systems is still quite limited in Belgium, but they can 
have a great future when the legislator broadens the field of application for 




























































































other collection systems are very promising as environmental policy instruments. 
It is too early yet to speak about significant environmental improvement (e.g. 
reduction of waste streams) because of these systems, but no manifest 
disadvantages have emerged for the moment.
In the framework of these systems, one must also consider the federal and 
regional initiatives which are in preparation for implementing EC directive 94/62 
concerning packaging and packaging waste (Deketelaere 1995). These initiatives 
concern the establishment of a take-back obligation in order to achieve the use 
and recycling targets laid down in the agreement between the three Belgian 
regions over the prevention and the management of household packaging waste. 
Those responsible for packaging are obligated to take back packaging waste that 
they bring into consumption in Belgium, enough to reach the specified use. and 
recycling targets. The packaging producer can fulfil this take-back obligation 
himself or invoke a third party (e.g. a recognised organisation).
Furthermore, Article 10 of the decree of the Flemish Parliament of 2 July 
1981 concerning the prevention and management of waste allows for additional 
acceptance obligations (Deketelaere 1995). For (not yet) indicated categories of 
waste, including packagings, the retail dealer, the wholesale dealer and the 
producer or importer have to accept the waste and the packagings of the products 
which they have sold, according to the principle "one for one". They can fulfil 
this acceptance obligation themselves or invoke a third party (e.g. a recognised 
organisation).
As of late 1996, neither the take-back obligation nor the acceptance obligation 
was yet applicable.
Conclusion
An analysis of environmental policy at the federal and regional levels in Belgium 
indicates that there is still a dominant use of traditional instruments of direct 
regulation. However, in recent years these have been more and more 
supplemented with other categories of environmental policy instruments, 
especially instruments of social regulation (environmental policy agreements; 
environmental care systems) and instruments of market regulation (environmental 
levies; ecological tax differentiation; environmental subsidies; deposit, refund, 
return premium or other collection systems).
This Belgian evolution concerning the choice of environmental policy 




























































































environmental action programme. Instruments of direct regulation will remain the 
cornerstone of environmental policy, but must be augmented with other 
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